Fake Claude Code: a Cursor extension served as a Trojan horse
A fake Claude Code extension circulated for about 11 hours on the Cursor marketplace on October 29, 2026. Up to 5,000 users were affected, with an attempt to install an SSH backdoor on macOS and Windows.
A tampered copy of Anthropic's Claude Code extension was distributed on Cursor's marketplace for about 11 hours on October 29, 2026, before being removed. According to Cursor, up to 5,000 users may have downloaded it, with an attempt to install an SSH backdoor on their machines. The critical issue is not only the initial fraud: the attack also showed that persistence could survive the removal of the extension.
A fake plugin, a real attack chain
Versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 presented themselves as Claude Code, Anthropic's coding assistant, but were not developed by the company. Cursor specifies that the threat mainly targeted macOS and Windows, while its indicators of compromise also cover Linux. In the incidents analyzed by Expel, all affected machines were Macs. Not exactly the kind of feature a developer expects from a code editor.
The pattern is classic for a software supply chain attack: theft of local information, addition of the attacker's SSH key, then creation of a reverse SSH tunnel to their server. This mechanism bypasses perimeter defenses, as the outgoing connection originates from the infected machine. Cursor notes, however, that remote access is only possible if the machine's SSH service is enabled.
Why removing the extension is not enough
The most troubling point for security teams concerns persistence. On macOS, the malware installed a launch agent named com.apple.sysmond.plist to restart the tunnel when the user logs in, then attempted to reconnect approximately every 60 seconds. Cursor warns that uninstallation "may not be sufficient." Expel goes further: in one of its four cases, the first malicious activity appeared about eight hours after the official exposure window ended.
In other words, limiting to the 11-hour window communicated by Cursor may allow infected machines to slip through. The scenario is plausible if the file was downloaded during the window, then executed later at the next Cursor launch. Teams that only looked at the distribution timeframe may have missed the main issue. An infection waiting for its moment is almost malicious politeness.
What attackers retrieve from the machine
Even before the remote access attempt, the malicious code collected information about the host: machine name, username, Git email, public IP address, architecture, working directories, and environment variable names. Phorion, which studied the attack, indicates that up to 40 variable names possibly corresponding to keys, tokens, or secrets were sent, without their values. This is already significant: it gives the attacker a quick map of the most interesting machines.
Cursor also published precise indicators: the address 134.209.82[.]225, the path ~/.config/.smt or ~/.config/.smtk on macOS and Linux, as well as %USERPROFILE%\.config\smt.cmd on Windows. The scripts also used task or agent names masquerading as legitimate components, such as SysMon on Windows. This facade of discretion often makes the difference between an isolated alert and a lasting compromise.
Distribution via Anthropic's official channel on Cursor
Cursor says it removed the compromised versions, temporarily closed its marketplace, then reopened the service after verification. Anthropic, for its part, assures that its own systems were not compromised and that the malicious version was neither developed nor published by them. The sticking point remains the distribution channel: according to Phorion, the fake version 2.1.313 was published via Anthropic's official account on Cursor, giving it a legitimacy that was hard to spot.
For technical teams, the right reflex is therefore not just to wait for a patch. Cursor recommends upgrading to Claude Code for VS Code version 2.1.314 and searching for backdoor traces on all machines using Cursor, not only those that installed the extension during the October 29 window. Indicators also include connections to the attacking IP, commands containing tunnel@134.209.82[.]225, and temporary files .stk_ on macOS. The real risk here is the operational blind spot: a development tool turned into an initial access vector.
Key points
- Up to 5,000 Cursor users affected, according to the notice.
- Two trapped versions: 2.1.312 and 2.1.313.
- Exposure window: about 11 hours on October 29, 2026.
- Expel saw one case eight hours after closure.
- Anthropic says it did not publish these versions.
- Cursor requested upgrading to version 2.1.314.
By the numbers
- 5,000 users — maximum estimated impact by Cursor, October 29, 2026.
- 11 hours — duration of the fake versions' presence in Cursor's marketplace.
- 4 incidents — cases analyzed by Expel at four clients.
- 40 variable names — identified by Phorion on targeted machines.