Trapped Claude Code extension exposed developers via Cursor
A modified version of the Claude Code extension circulated on the Cursor marketplace for about 11 hours. It added an SSH key, installed persistence, and sent system info to a hacker server.
A malicious version of the Anthropic.claude-code extension was distributed on the Cursor marketplace on October 29, 2026, between 2:27 AM and 1:35 PM PT, before being removed. Cursor states that builds 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 for macOS and Windows were affected, with no sign of impact on other extensions in the catalog. The case is significant because it combines supply chain, developer workstation, and SSH persistence, with a real risk for machines where an SSH server was already active.
A fake Claude Code, but a real trust chain problem
Cursor explains that the trapped version was not developed by Anthropic. The malicious code was grafted at the beginning of the extension.js file, leaving the rest of the legitimate extension intact. Result: on loading, the extension executed a discreet payload, without any user action on Claude Code itself. This kind of detail turns a simple plugin into a very rude entry point.
According to Cursor, the extension collected the hostname, username, architecture, operating system, home folder path, environment variable names, working directories, configured Git email address, and public IP. It also attempted to add an SSH key controlled by the attacker, enable local SSH access, and open a reverse SSH tunnel to 134.209.82.225. On macOS, persistence was achieved via a LaunchAgent; on Windows, via a scheduled task and a startup script.
Why not all workstations were necessarily open
Analysts cited in the sources agree on one point: the malware could install its key and persistence, but it did not always manage to obtain full remote access. On macOS, enabling Remote Login requires admin rights. On Windows, the code tried to launch OpenSSH in a clumsy way, via a command that does not correspond to a standard installation. In these cases, the tunnel sometimes existed, but there was nothing to reach behind the door.
However, the rest should not be underestimated. Even without an interactive session, the extension was able to send reconnaissance data to the attacking server, then install fallback mechanisms to persist after reboot. The sources also emphasize a broader point: Linux servers or remote development environments with active sshd are more exposed than laptops without SSH service. There, the tunnel has a real interlocutor.
What Cursor recommends checking immediately
Cursor asks users who installed or updated Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 from its marketplace during the indicated window to check for the presence of the SSH key marked svc-telemetry. The publisher provides separate commands for macOS and Windows, as well as remediation scripts to remove the malicious extension, persistence mechanisms, and the rogue key. Machines showing execution traces must be isolated, then assessed for a possible rebuild.
- 2 versions — 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, reported by Cursor.
- About 11 hours — distribution window, from 2:27 AM to 1:35 PM PT.
- 1 server — 134.209.82.225, rebound point of the tunnel and beacon.
- 1 SSH key — comment svc-telemetry, to be searched in authorized_keys.
- Up to 5,000 users — estimate advanced by Cursor and echoed by sources.
Cursor says it removed the compromised version, audited other extensions, rotated its keys, and relaunched its marketplace afterward. The attacker’s server was also taken offline with the host’s help. One question remains hanging over the incident: how a package under the Anthropic name could pass through the door of a marketplace used by hurried developers. A classic security issue, plugin version. And, as often, a too-quick click saves two minutes and costs an evening.
What this changes for teams using code assistants
The incident reminds us that an AI extension is not just a productivity convenience. It is also code executed locally, with potential access to the system, environment secrets, and work credentials. In this context, teams relying on Cursor, VS Code, or third-party marketplaces should treat their extensions as critical components, with review, inventory, and monitoring. The sources also mention Remote-SSH environments, where the extension can be installed on the remote machine itself, not just on the developer’s workstation.
In short, the incident is not limited to “uninstalling a plugin.” It touches on local rights, key management, SSH logs, and governance of development tools. It is less spectacular than a giant leak, but often more concrete for teams who must restore workstations and verify that no access remains.
Key points
- Cursor removed the compromised version on October 29, 2026.
- The exposure window lasted about 11 hours.
- Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 are targeted.
- The rogue key carries the comment svc-telemetry.
- Cursor mentions up to 5,000 exposed users.
- The attacker’s server was cut off by the host.