Fake Claude Code extension infiltrates Cursor’s store

A trapped version of Claude Code was offered on Cursor’s extension store for just over eleven hours. Cursor reports an incident affecting up to 5,000 users and closed its store as a precaution.

On October 29, 2026, Cursor’s extension store distributed a fake update of Claude Code, Anthropic’s programming assistant, containing malicious code. The extension remained online for just over eleven hours, between 10:27 and 21:35 Paris time, and was reportedly downloaded by up to 5,000 users. Cursor removed the trapped version, suspended its store as a precaution, and said it is verifying that no other extension was compromised. This case serves as a reminder that an overly trusting extension market can quickly turn into a bad experience.

What the extension did once installed

According to Cursor’s communication, version 2.1.313 "was not developed by Anthropic." Its primary goal was to profile the infected machine by collecting the operating system, processor architecture, home folder path, email address configured in Git, and public IP address, then sending this data to a server controlled by the attacker. The extension then attempted to install persistent access via an SSH key named "svc-telemetry," added to the list of authorized keys on the machine.

The code also tried to activate the local SSH service and create a reverse tunnel, i.e., a connection initiated from the victim’s computer to the attacker’s server, allowing later access to the machine. Finally, a persistence mechanism was planned to survive reboots. In short, the fake update aimed not only to spy but also to establish a long-term foothold.

A partially failed but significant hack

Not everything went as planned for the attacker. Cursor indicates that errors in the malicious code caused the tunnel opening to fail in most cases, except in the very particular situation where Cursor was run with administrator privileges. Activating the local SSH service requires these rights, which are rarely available on everyday macOS and Windows computers.

Nevertheless, affected machines did not come out unscathed. Even when the tunnel failed, the extension did add the attacker’s key, installed persistence scripts, and transmitted information about the local environment. Cursor states it worked with the malicious server’s host to take it offline, then blocked distribution of the compromised version.

Why Cursor closed its extension store

The publisher took a more radical measure than simply removing the trapped package: it completely closed its extension store while verifying that no other module was affected. This decision aims to rebuild the service on what are deemed secure foundations but mainly highlights the fragility of a model where an extension can be published under a known actor’s name without immediate alert.

The main blind spot remains. The security notice does not say how the attacker managed to publish, in Cursor’s store, a version of the extension bearing Anthropic’s name. At this stage, this point remains [to be verified].

Key points

  • October 29, 2026: incident at Cursor’s store.
  • Up to 5,000 users affected, according to Cursor.
  • Version 2.1.313: extension not developed by Anthropic.
  • Online for over eleven hours, between 10:27 and 21:35.
  • Cursor closed its store as a precaution.

By the numbers

  • 5,000 users — maximum estimated by Cursor, 2026.
  • 11 hours — duration online, October 29, 2026, Paris time.
  • 2 actors named — Cursor and Anthropic, in the security notice.
  • Version 2.1.313 — number of the fake update, 2026.

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